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Abstract
How do belligerents choose and change their military strategies during war?
How do these strategies shape war? To address these questions, we develop
a random-walk model of war, where two belligerents ght over forts across
periods. The random walk represents a battlefront, which moves as the war
evolves, resulting in the occupation of more forts for the winning side and less
forts for the losing side. Unlike existing models, ours allows the belligerents to
choose an action out of moving forward, inicting costs, and surrender in every
battle. We found that equilibrium strategies are monotonic with respect to the
walka belligerent will punish its opponent if it is su¢ciently advantageous and
surrender if it is too disadvantageous. Accordingly, the punishment strategy
can function to shorten the war. Moreover, a severer punishment tends to make
the war even shorter.
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1 Introduction
In his masterpiece On War, Clausewitz (1832: 90) stipulated that three broad ob-
jectives of military engagement are the armed forces, the country, and the enemys
will.1 Based on this stipulation, formal models of war can be categorized into three
kinds: the combat models initiated by Lanchester (1916), where belligerents ex-
change attacks on armed forces (Bellany 1999; Langlois and Langlois 2009, 2012);
the random-walk models, where war is regarded as a territorial contest over country
(Slantchev 2003b; Smith 1998; Smith and Stam 2003, 2004); the bargaining models,
where armed forces are treated as a means of coercion to inuence the enemys will
(Fearon 2004, 2007; Filson and Werner 2002, 2004; Leveto¼glu Slantchev 2007; Powell
2004a, 2004b, 2012; Slantchev 2003a, 2011; Wagner 2000). Despite the development
of models of war, there have been few theoretical studies that address the choice
among two or more of these objectives as the targets of attacks.2 Built upon the
Gamblers Ruin Problem, this article o¤ers a random-walk model of war, where two
belligerents choose the targets of attacks between the country and the enemys will
in each battle denoted by the state variable.3
As with other random-walk models of war shown above, the walk of our model
represents a battlefront, or the distribution of forts between the belligerents, which
moves as the war evolves. However, unlike other models, our model incorporates
not only the decision to surrender (Smith 1998) but also the decision to punishment
for the sake of strategic analysis. That means, our model allows the belligerents to
choose an action out of moving forward, punishment, or surrender in each battle. By
moving forward, a belligerent can occupy a fort from the opponent with a certain
probability. With punishment, it cannot occupy a fort but can inict a heavier cost
on the opponent. By equilibrium analysis, we illuminate how the belligerents choose
and change their actions throughout the war and also how their choices shape the
war.
This article also aims to contribute to the theoretical literature on military strat-
1Among the three objectives, Clausewitz (1832: 99, 229) prioritized the armed forces. Liddell-
Hart (1967: 352) notably disagreed.
2As exceptions, Snyder (1961) and Intriligator and Brito (1984) illuminate the choice betweeen
counterforce and coutervalue attacks for nuclear deterrence. Some other models disallow the choice
of targets but pertain to two of the three kindsdepicting shifts of military balance while bargaining
(Langlois and Langlois 2009, 2012; Slantchev 2003b; Smith and Stam 2004).
3The Gamblers Ruin Problem was rst posed by Blaise Pascal (Edward 1983).
egy, which have remained understudied as of today. Recent bargaining models of
war have incorporated military strategies such as concealment of strength (Baliga
and Sjöström 2008; Meirowitz and Sartori 2008; Slantchev 2010), indirect strategy
(Lindsey 2015), and fait accompli (Tarar 2016), but they commonly presume the rel-
ative strength between belligerents to be xed throughout war.4 Unlike them, our
model illuminates the shift of military balance by incorporating the random walk. Al-
though our model abstracts away the bargaining aspect of war, it does allow strategic
termination of war in light of developments on the battleeld.
The rest of this article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the random-walk
models of war, to which the decision to surrender is added in Section 3 and the
decision to punishment further added in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
4In the context of nuclear deterrence, some strategies have been formally studied such as the risk
strategy (Powell 1987, 1988), limited retaliation (Powell 1989), and counterforce rst strike (Wagner
1991). Also in the context of counter-terrorism, the choice between preemption and deterrence has
been investigated (Nakao 2019; Sandler and Siqueira 2006).
Figure 1: The random-walk model of war.
2 The Random-Walk Model of War
To explore belligerents choices of military strategies, we develop a random-walk model
of war, where the belligerents, while ghting, choose to move their forces forward or
to inict costs on the opponent. Our model is based on the Gamblers Ruin Problem.5
We begin with the Problem and subsequently add to it the choice to surrender and
further the choice to punish the opponent. In doing so, we will examine how the
inclusion of these choices inuences the war.
2.1 War as Gamblers Ruin
In the model, there are two belligerents (; ), who ght each other over X forts in
time periods t = 0; 1; 2;    . Let xt denote the number of forts  occupies in period t:
xt 2 f0; 1; 2;    ; Xg ;
which can also be interpreted as s strategic depth in t. At the wars onset (t = 0), 
occupies x0 forts, whereas  occupies X x0 forts (Figure 1). As the war evolves, the
battlefront xt moves at random. In each period t, they ght a battle, which ends in
s win, loss, or draw with respective probabilities p, q, and r such that p+ q+ r = 1.
The winner of a battle captures an additional fort from the loser, so that
p  Pr (xt+1 = xt + 1)
q  Pr (xt+1 = xt   1)
r  Pr (xt+1 = xt) :
5The Gamblers Ruin Problem is delineated as follows. At the beginning,  has x0 tokens, while
 has X   x0 tokens. They play a series of bets. For each bet,  wins with probability p, and 
wins with probability 1   p. If  wins a bet,  receives one token from . If  wins a bet,  gets
one token from . The game ends with either players victory if the other player loses all his tokens.
For simplicity, we assume the match to be even; i.e., p = q. The entire war ends when
either belligerent loses all its forts; i.e.,  loses the war (and  wins it) if xt = 0, and
 wins the war if xt = X.
The model above has the following properties:
Lemma 1 (i) The probability that  wins the war is x0
X
. (ii) The expected duration
of the war is x0(X x0)
2p
.
Proof. The proof is immediate from Epstein (1995) and thus is omitted.
3 The Decision to Surrender
We next incorporate to the model the choice to surrender. In the subsequent model,
the belligerents are allowed to surrender conditional on xt. At the wars onset, they
determine their stop losses (a; b), or the numbers of forts to lose before surrendering.6
In making the surrender decisions, they aim to maximize their own continuation
payo¤s (;), which consist of the lump-sum benet W > 0 from winning the
war, the lump-sum loss L > 0 of losing the war (with W > L), and the per-period
cost c > 0 of ghting. Their optimization problems can be shown as:
max
a
W
a
a+ b
  L
b
a+ b
 
abc
2p
(1)
s.t. a 2 f1; 2;    ; x0g
max
b
W
b
a+ b
  L
a
a+ b
 
abc
2p
; (2)
s.t. b 2 f1; 2;    ; X   x0g
for which the probability that  wins the war is a
a+b
, and the expected duration ab
2p
(Lemma 1).
Problems (1, 2) are solvable in a closed form if a certain condition is met:
Proposition 1 Suppose there exists a natural number 	 such that 	 

2p(W+L)
c
 1
2
.
If both x0 and X   x0 are su¢ciently large, any pair (a
; b) forms a Markov perfect
equilibrium such that
a + b = 	: (3)
6For instance,  continues to ght as far as it loses no more than a forts and surrenders if it loses
a+ 1 forts.
Proof. The proof appears in Appendix.
Although Proposition 1 suggests multiple equilibria, each of them actually forms
an equilibrium of every subgame in a single Markov perfect equilibriumthe players
incentives remain compatible with the equilibrium behavior even when the state vari-
able xt moves. For instance, even after  wins battles and occupies more forts, they
continue to ght as far as the number of forts  lost is less than a. The proposition
also shows that the equilibrium strategies are monotonic with respect to the state
variable xta belligerents decision depends on a threshold of the number of its forts,
above which it ghts and below which it surrenders (Smith 1998).
In light of the surrender decision, states are better represented by the number of
forts that each belligerent can lose before surrendering rather than by the absolute
size of xt.
Denition 1 State (a; b) denotes the one where  has a forts to lose before surren-
dering without punishment, and  has b corresponding forts.
For instance, as  wins a battle in state (a; b), they move to (a  1; b+ 1). With
additional moves,  will surrender once they reach (0; a+ b).
4 The Decision to Punishment
We further introduce to the model the choice of punishment. In the next model, the
players have the choice to punish each other conditional on state (a; b). A punishment
can inict a cost cP larger than c on the opponent, but it cannot win a battle.
Accordingly, the probability that the punished party wins a battle doubles if it ghts.7
If both the parties adopt punishments, neither party can win a battle, as in the model
of war of attrition (Maynard Smith 1974).8
A belligerent is willing to adopt punishment to which the targeted opponent sur-
renders if punishment is so severe that the targets continuation payo¤ from ghting
falls below the loss of surrendering  L:
7For instance, if  moves forward while  adopts punishment in (a; b), the probability distribution
of battle outcomes is: 2p = Pr (a+ 1; b  1); 0 = Pr (a  1; b+ 1); r = Pr (a; b) :
8As we rule out mixed strategies, no equilibrium emerges where both the belligerents adopt
punishments.
Figure 2: The thresholds of surrender and punishment.
Proposition 2 In state (1;	  1),  adopts punishment while  surrenders if the
cost of being punished is so large that
cP >
2p (W + L)
	  1
  (	  2) c: (4)
Symmetrically, in state (	  1; 1),  adopts punishment while  surrenders if Con-
dition (4) holds.
Proof. The proof appears in Appendix.
While Proposition 1 implies that the war can end earlier if surrender is an option
it ends in (0;	) or (	; 0), Proposition 2 further suggests that the war can be even
shorter in light of severe punishmentit ends in (1;	  1) or (	  1; 1). The disad-
vantageous party would surrender one-fort earlier if punishment is an option (Figure
2).9
The proposition also delineates how the war evolves in light of punishment. In
early stages of the war, when both the belligerents retain enough forts in reserve, they
ght conventionally to move their forces forward. However, toward the last stage when
either side establishes its advantageous position by pushing the battlefront forward, it
9For Figure 2, the following parameter values are adopted: x0 = 6, X = 12, W = 200, L = 0,
c = 1, and p = 1
4
. Then, the symmetric equilibrium without punishment is: (a; b) = (5; 5) with
	 = 10. A belligerent would surrender with at least one fort more (i.e., earlier) in light of punishment
with cP > 28
9
.
will introduce the punishment strategy to coerce its opponent into capitulation. This
pattern could be found at least in some past wars, where the prevailing side with
advanced military technology and a­uent resources exerted punishment strategies
toward the end (e.g., Pacic War, Vietnam War).10
More generally, in any state (a; b) with a + b = 	, the war can end with the
prevailing sides punishment if it is severe enough:
Corollary 1 In state (k;	  k) with k 2 f1; 2;    ; a   1g,  adopts a punishment
while  surrenders if the cost of being punished is so large that
cP >
2p (W + L)
(	  k)
  (	  (k + 1)) c: (5)
Symmetrically, in state (	  k0; k0) with k0 2 f1; 2;    ; b   1g,  adopts punishment
while  surrenders if Condition (5) holds.
Proof. The proof can be derived in a way similar to that of Proposition 2 and thus
is omitted.
Corollary 1 holds the monotonicity of the equilibrium strategies in terms of pun-
ishment; as with surrender (Proposition 1), there exists a certain threshold of forts
occupied, above which a belligerent punishes, and below which it moves forward.
To summarize, the equilibrium strategies are monotonic in terms of all punishment,
conventional ght, and surrendera belligerent adopts punishment when it occupies
enough forts to prevail, ght conventionally to move forward when it lies midway
between victory and defeat, and surrenders when it retains few forts to spare. In
short, the belligerents hinge their actions on their strategic positions, or on how ad-
vantageous they waged the war.
Moreover, the timing of punishment can also depend on its severity:
Proposition 3 If the cost cP of being punished is greater, a punishment tends to be
adopted earlier, and the war tends to end sooner.
10Both the Pacic and Vietnamese Wars involved punishments toward their ends. The Pacic
War ended with the drops of two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki before the execution of
the Operation Downfall, or the U.S. campaign to invade the mainland of Japan. The Vietnamese
War was settled shortly after Linebacker II, which aimed to produce psychological impacts on the
Northern leaders by inicting the utmost civilian distress (Clodfelter 1989: 182-184).
Proof. Let c (k) denote the threshold of Condition (5):
c (k) 
2p (W + L)
(	  k)
  (	  (k + 1)) c;
which increases with k, or
dc (k)
dk
=
2p (W + L)
(	  k)2
+ c > 0:
This implies that for  to surrender in state (k;	  k) with a larger k, a larger cP is
needed.
Proposition 3 implies that the timing of punishment depends on its severity, which
in turn inuences the duration of war. If one retains a more powerful punitive mea-
sure, it might not need to occupy many forts to initiate punishment. In other words,
the proposition suggests a tradeo¤ between the occupation of forts and the severity
of punishment. A harder punisher could end the war sooner.
5 Conclusion
Despite the growing theoretical literature on the process of war especially since Smith
(1998) andWagner (2000), there have been limited theoretical studies on how military
strategies are adopted during war (Intriligator and Brito 1984; Lindsey 2015; Powell
1987, 1988, 1989; Wagner 1991; Tarar 2016). We have conducted the rst theoretical
attempt to incorporate military strategies into a random-walk model of war, where
two belligerents choose to move their forces forward, punish each other, or surrender
in each battle. Unlike bargaining models of war, which commonly regard armed forces
as a means of coercion (Fearon 2004, 2007; Filson and Werner 2002, 2004; Leveto¼glu
Slantchev 2007; Powell 2004a, 2004b, 2012; Slantchev 2003a, 2011; Wagner 2000),
our model delineates both physical and psychological elements of armed forcesone
to seize enemy forts in a territorial contest, and the other to compel the opponent
to capitulation through inicting pain.
Our theory predicts some patterns in the choices of military strategies. At the
early stage of war, when the distribution of forts is more or less equal between the two
belligerents, they both aim at occupying more forts to produce military imbalance
in their favor, while refraining from the punishment strategy. Because punishment
entails the loss of opportunities to seize more forts, punishment could put the pun-
isher himself in a disadvantageous position unless it could bring about the opponents
surrender. In contrast, toward the end of war, when either belligerent overpowers
the other in terms of the distribution of forts, the prevailing side might resort to
punishment, to which the prevailed side is expected to give in. With enough sever-
ity, punishment could reduce the cost of prosecuting a war by shortening it. These
patterns conrm the monotonicity of equilibrium strategies with respect to the state
variable (Smith 1998)punishment is employed when a belligerent is su¢ciently ad-
vantageous and surrender is chosen when he is too disadvantageous.
The Pacic War comports with our theoretical predictions. During the War, the
U.S. initiated the leapfrogging strategy in 1943 to capture successive islands with
high strategic values from the South Sea to the Japanese mainland. In the summer of
1944 when Japan lost the Mariana Islands (the Absolute Zone of National Defense),
the U.S. military victory of the War became a matter of time (Alperovitz 1995:
ch. 2). Shortly after the Battle of Iwo Jima, which was critical to its strategic air
campaigns, the U.S. introduced a series of punishment strategies in 1945, including
naval blockades of major ports, incendiary bombings on cities, and drops of two
atomic bombs, to which Japan nally surrendered (Asada 1998).
Our theory suggests that the coerciveness of punishment depends on the relative
military balance (i.e., the distribution of forts). Therefore, punishment can have a
greater coercive e¤ect if the punisher occupies more forts, but even without occupying
many forts, punishment can end the war if it can inict a large cost by itself. In this
regard, a war could be shorter if punishments are severer; in other words, the duration
of war would be negatively associated with the severity of punishment. Ultimately,
in light of punishment with extreme severity, a war could not occur in the rst place,
as the nuclear peace theory claims (Waltz 1981).
To conclude, we have explored the choice of military strategies during war and
found that the choice depends on the relative military balanceas measured by the
distribution of forts in our modelwhich is determined by the past battle outcomes.
By contrast, the strategies themselves can also a¤ect how the war will further evolve
(Arreguin-Toft 2011; Bennett and Stam 1996; Horowitz and Reiter 2001; Mearsheimer
1983; Pape 1996; Reiter 1999; Reiter and Stam 1998, 2002; Stam 1996; Toft and
Zhukov 2012). Therefore, the analysis of military strategy demands the consideration
of the mutual inuence between military strategy and war. For instance, the seeming
association between the punishment strategy and the punishers victory, as found in
our model, does not necessarily guarantee that punishment can bring about a victory
(Reiter and Stam 1998, 2002; Stam 1996). Opposingly, it might be the military
imbalance that induces the prevailing side to adopt punishment (Downes 2008: ch.
2). This simultaneity problem makes the study of military strategy a di¢cult but
promising agenda for further research.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. Problems (1, 2) give the identical rst-order condition,
or Equation (3), implying multiple equilibria. To ensure the existence of them, we
examine s incentive in each state. Because the game is symmetric with respect to
the players, s incentive compatibility su¢ces s.
In state (1;	  1), s continuation payo¤ from ghting is:
 (1;	  1) =
W   (	  1)L
	
  (	  1) c
= c  L >  L;
guaranteeing that  is willing to ght in state (1;	  1), which corresponds to s
least advantageous state on the equilibrium path. In addition, s continuation payo¤
from ghting increases as a rises and b falls while a+ b = 	 kept as a constant:11
d (a;	  a)
da
=
W + L
	
 
	  2a
2p
c
=
ac
p
> 0;
which guarantees that  is willing to ght as it wins more forts. In contrast,  is
unwilling to ght when it loses one more additional fort than what the equilibrium
species, or when it is in state (1;	), because
 (1;	) =
W   L	
	+ 1
 
	
2p
c
=
W + L
2p(W+L)
c
 1
2
+ 1
  L 
W + L
2p(W+L)
c
 1
2
<  L:
Moreover,  remains unwilling to ght as it loses even more forts, or
d (1;	)
d	
=  
W + L
(	 + 1)2
 
c
2p
< 0:
To conclude, given s strategy b,  is willing to ght until it loses 	   b forts and
surrenders if it loses more than 	  b.
11This condition di¤ers form the rst-order condition in that for the latter, b (instead of 	) is
kept as a constant.
Proof of Proposition 2. We examine s incentive to surrender in state (1;	  1)
when  adopts punishment.
Being punished when it has only one fort, s continuation payo¤ in (1;	  1) is:
P 1 (1;	  1) = 
P 1
 (2;	  2) 
cP
2p
; (6)
for which  can go to (2;	  2) for sure at the expected cost c
P
2p
of being punished,
because  cannot win a battle with punishment.
As  wins a fort in (1;	  1), s continuation payo¤ in (2;	  2) is:
P 1 (2;	  2) =
1
	  1
W +

	  2
	  1

 (2;	  2) 
cP
2p

 
(	  2) c
2p
= W  
(	  2) cP
2p
 
(	  1) (	  2)
2p
c; (7)
for which a single loss results in (1;	  1), and  has 	  2 more forts to occupy to
win the war (Lemma 1).
By plugging Equation (7) into (6), the condition for s surrender can be derived;
 yields to s punishment in (1;	  1) if P 1 (1;	  1) <  L, or if
P 1 (1;	  1) =

W  
(	  2) cP
2p
 
(	  1) (	  2)
2p
c

 
cP
2p
= W  
(	  1) cP
2p
 
(	  1) (	  2)
2p
c <  L;
which is equivalent to Inequality (4).
